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BANKRUPTCY-ATTORNEYS-ALLOWANCE.-PRATT V. BOTHE, 12 AM. B. R.
529.-Held, that the compensation allowed an involuntary bankrupt's attor-
ney under the provisions of Sec. 6od of the American Bankruptcy Act relates
to services to be rendered while the debtor is "in contemplation of bank-
ruptcy," and not to services to be rendered after bankruptcy proceedings
have commenced, compensation for which is provided for by Clause 3 of Sec.
64b.
Section 6od refers to such services as are to be rendered by an attorney,
solicitor or practor for a person in contemplation of bankruptcy and they are
a valid debt against the estate though not provable as a preferential claim.
In re Morris, ii Am. B. R. r45; Re Laine, 16 N. B. R. 168. Compensation
for professional services rendered by an attorney after bankrupt proceedings
have begun and by which the bankrupt is assisted in performing the duties
imposed upon him, is provided for by Sec. 64b. In re Carr, 9 Am. B. R. s8;
In re Michel, x Am. B. R. 665; In ref W. H. Mercantile Co., 2 Am. B. R.
420: There are no provisions made for compensation for services rendered by
an attorney in general litigation or in the course of the debtor's business, but
if rendered before bankrupt proceedings they are classed with the other
claims against the estate; if after, and especially if rendered in resisting the
creditors' petition for adjudication in bankruptcy, only those funds remaining
after d1 debts are paid are subject to their liquidation. In re Woodard.
2 Am. B. R. 692; In re Rosenthal, 9 Am. B. R. 626. One of the objects of
Congress in passing the Bankrupt Act was to give to creditors, rather than
the agents and attorneys assisting the court and distributing the bankrupt
estate, the favored place. Re J. W, H. Mercantile Co., 2 Am. B. R. 420.
As to an attorney's allowance in voluntary proceedings, see In re Bock, x Am.
B. R. 535; and see In re Hirsckberg, 2 Ben. 466, for construction of Sec. 64b.
The doctrine announced in In re Kross, 3 Am. B. R., and disapproved by
the court in the case under discussion is also distinctly denied in In re Moyer,
4 Am. B. R. 238; In re Terrill, xo3 Fed. 781; In re Anderson, xo3 Fed. 854.
BANKRUPTCY-CLAIM-CREDITOR PLEADING USURY As DEFENSE.-IN RE
WORTH, X2 Am. B. R. 566 (Iow).-Held that in a jurisdiction where the rule
is that usury is personal to the borrower, creditors of the bankrupt cannot
interpose usury against the claims of another creditor upon a contract to
which they are neither parties nor privies.
The rule as to the persons who may interpose the defense of usury,
whether strangers, parties, privies or the borrower himself, differs in the dif-
ferent states. Thus privilege of pleading usury is held to be personal to the
borrower, Yardley v'. N. Y. G. &- Ind. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 18125; Loomis
v. Eaton, 32 Ch. 55o; Ohio &- ff. R. Co. v. Kasson, 37 N. Y. 218. Where a
state statute does not declare a usurious contract utterly void, it is valid as to
strangers to the usury. Fleckner v. U. S. Bank, 2x U. S. 338. A trustee in
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bankruptcy can avail himself of the defense of usury as against an obligation of
the bankrupt. In re Kellogg, io Am. B. R. 7. A trustee, under operation of
the Bankruptcy Law, is a privy in estate with the borrower, and stands in the
same relation with a mortgagee as the bankrupt stands, so far as the defense of
usury is concerned- Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 78 N. Y. 1So.
The trustee stands in the shoes of the bankrupt. Bankruptcy Act, 70 a;
Wheelock v. Lee, 64 N. Y. 243. He is his legal representative. Wright Vt.
First Nat. Bank, Fed. Cas. No. 18078; Collier on Bankrupty, 2nd. Ed.,
415-417-
BANKRUPTCY-INVENTOR'S RIGHTs BEFORE PATENT-TRANSFER.-IN RE
DANN, 129 FED. 4 95.-The Bankruptcy Act expressly provides for a transfer, to
the trustee in bankruptcy, of the bankrupt's interest in patents, patent rights,
copyrights and trade marks, and Rev. Stat. See. 4895, clause 5, provides for a
surrender of all property, which, prior to filing of petition, the bankrupt could
by any means have transferred. Held, that a bankrupt's incorporeal interest
in an alleged invention pending application for patent, was not such property
as would pass to his trustee.
This question seems not to have arisen before in this country, and in the
only English case found on the point the holding of the court was contrary to
the decision in the present case. Hesse v'. Stevenson, 3 Bos. & P. 565. In
the absence of statutes, an inventor has rights to the fruits of his ingenuity,
but he cannot prevent others from enjoying them to the same extent. Patter-
son vt. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501, 507. Substantial property right of exclusive
use in an invention is created alone by patent. Gayler v. Wilder, zo How.
477. An assignment of patent rights is good, though the invention be not
then patented. Hendrie v'. Sayles, 98 U. S. 546; Dalzell v. .Dueber Watch
Case M(fg. CO., 149 U. S. 315. Materials of a newly invented machine pass
to the trustee, though the patent for the invention has not then been granted.
Sawin v. Guild, I Gallis. 485. It is difficult to see the reason for holding that
the inventor has property right enough in his invention before patent to make
a valid assignment, but that in case of an assignment by operation of law he
has not such property rights, if his invention be not then patented. There
are dicta, however, in the well-considered case of Gillett et al. %'. Bate et al.,
86 N. Y. 87, which support the decision in the present case.
BRIBERY-VALIDITY OF AcT.-STATE v. LEHMAN, 81 S. W. Ixz8 (Mo.).-
Held, that in order to constitute bribery it is not necessary that the vote of
the official bribed should be on a valid measure.
The present case is in harmony with the rule laid down in Glovter v.
State, zog Ind. 391, where a local official was held to be guilty of bribery,
although the contract which he was bribed to make was not binding upon the
township. It is also held in some jurisdictions to be immaterial whether or
not the official bribed possessed the authority requisite to perform the act.
In re Bozeman, 42 Kan. 451. But the rule in the Federal courts is otherwise.
U. S. v. Gibson, 47 Fed. 833; U. S. v. Boyer, 85 Fed. 425. An offer to bribe
a judge as to the decision of a case to be instituted before him in the future,
where, however, it was never actually commenced, is indictable at common
law. Peopile v Markham, 64 Cal. 157. But the offering of money to alegis-
lator to vote for a certain person to fill an office which does not in fact exist is
not bribery. Com. v. Reese, z6 Ky. L. 493. Since the gist of the offense
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is the attempt to improperly influence official action, the. courts are not
inclined to regard the legality of the particular act as essential.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUE PROCzSs-FORFEITURE OF LAND FOR FAILURE
TO PAY TAXES.-RoPER LBR. CO. v. ELIZABETH CITY LBR. CO., 47 S. E. 757
(N. C.).-Held, that a statute, declaring that on failure of grantee of state
swamp lands to pay taxes due on same the interest of such grantee shall be
forfeited and vested in the state, without any proceeding or judicial determi-
nation, is invalid because it deprives the grantee of his property "without
due process of law," in violation of the state constitution.
By "law" in this provision is not meant merely an act of the legislature.
Calhoun v. Fletcher, 63 Ala. 574; Clark v. Mitchell, 64 Mo. 564. Nor can
one be deprived of his property without due process through the medium of a
constitutional convention. Clark v. Mitchell, 69 Mo. 627. Notice is required.
Iowa Cent. R. Co. v. Iow&, x6o U. S. 389; Louisville &' Nashville R. Co.
v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230. There must be an opportunity for a hearing.
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Simon v. Croft, x82 U. S. 427.
Judicial procedure is not always required. Davidson v. New Orleans, suJfra.
A proper exercise of the taxing power of a state does not deprive a citizen of
his property without due process of law, but the taxpayer must have some
kind of notice and an opportunity to be heard before the charge becomes
finally fixed upon his property. Santa Clara v. So. Pac. R. Co., iS Fed. 385;
Hayland v. Brazil Block Coal Co., 128 Ind. 335. Summary remedies may
be used in the collection of taxes, that could not be applied in cases of judicial
character. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &- ImJ. Co., x8 How. 272.
Statutes have been held valid which declared that upon failure to pay taxes
the land should be forfeited to the state by operation of law, without any
judicial proceeding or finding of any kind, the statutes providing further, that
lands so forfeited should, at a certain time, be offered for sale, the former
owner having a right to redeem at such sale. W. Va. v,. Shanangle et al.,
45 W. Va. 415; King v. Mullins, 171 U. S. 404. In the present case, as the
taxpayer is deprived of his property without any process at all, and as no
opportunity is afforded him to repossess it, the correctness of the decision
cannot be doubted. GroiFn v. Mixon, 38 Miss. 424.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATUTE FORBIDDING DISCHARGE OF EMPLOYRE-
MEMBERSHIP IN LABOR UNION.-COFFEYVILLE VITRIFIED BRICK & TILE Co. v.
PERRY, 76 PAC. 848 (KAN.).-Held, that a statute which makes it unlawful to
discharge an employee because he belongs to a lawful labor organization, and
which provides for the recovery of damages for such discharge, is unconstitu-
tional.
The right of employees to quit work singly or in a body is recognized.
U. S. v. Kane, 23 Fed. 748; Kingv . Ohio &- M. R. Co., 7 Biss. 533; U. S. v.
Workingmen's Council, 54 Fed. 794. The authorities put labor and capital
on the same plane. State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 74; Rogers v. Evarts, 17
N. Y. Supp. 264; State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 285. It is a part of a man's civil
rights that he be left at liberty to refuse business relations with another for
any reason. Dely v. Winfree, 8o Tex. 4oo: Orr v. Home Mut. Ins. Co, r2
La. Ann. 255. Labor is property and the right to contract and terminate con-
tracts is a property right preserved by the constitution. Frorer v. Peofile,
141 Il. 172; Millet V. Peofile, X17 Ill. 295. A statute which attempts to
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regulate such matters deprives a person of a constitutional right without due
process of law. State v. Loomis, II5 MO. 3o7; Com. v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117.
Itis unconstitutional where it subjects to criminal prosecution. Stone v. Miss.,
I U. S. 814; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98. Nor is the statute a police regulation,
for it does not expressly or impliedly promote the public health, welfare, com-
fort, or safety. Re Jacobs, sufira. Whether the statute in question was
unconstitutional, as being class legislation, is not considered in this case. It
was so considered in two parallel cases. State v. Tolle, 7X Mo. 64 ; Li.fifie-
man 'v. Peojfle, X75 Ill. xo6.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS-JUDGMENTS.-LAMB
v. POWDER RIVER LivE STOCK Co., x32 FED. 434.-A statute which prescribes
a general limitation of six years for all actions on foreign judgments, and, by
proviso, declares three months to be the limitation, if the judgment upon
which the said action is commenced is based on a cause of action which accrued
more than six years prior to the commencement of said action upon the judg-
ment, held, unconstitutional, as imposing in the proviso, an unreasonable
limitation upon a contract.
A statute impairing the remedy upon a contract impairs the obligation of
a contract and is unconstitutional. 2 Story on Const. §1385. An action upon
a judgment may indirectly be a remedy upon a contract. But a statute limiting
the time in which to bring an action does not impair the obligation of contract,
if it is reasonable. Antoniv. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 769. It is primarily the
province of the legislature to determine what a reasonable time is. Smith v.
Morrison, 22 Pick. 433; Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Peter 28o. But courts are
not hesitant in deciding for themselves, taking all the circumstances into
account. Koshkonong H. Burton, 104 U. S. 675; Wynn v. Stone, 69 Miss. 8o.
CRIMINAL LAw-HoMIcIDx-R.MARKS BY COUNSEL TO THE JUrY.-POWERS
V. COMMONWEALTH, 83 S. W 146, (Ky.).-Defendant and H. were jointly
indicted for conspiracy to murder. It was the theory of the state that H. fired
the fatal shot. On the separate trial of defendant the prosecuting attorney
stated that "H. was not hung but eleven of the twelve jurors who tried him
were in favor of hanging him, aud one was for life imprisonment and the
eleven had to come to one." The motion to exclude this was overruled by the
court. Held, that the error of the court in not sustaining the motion was pre-
judicial. Paynter, Hobson, and Nunn, JJ., dissenting.
By this decision the court reverses its decision in Parrott V. Common-
wealth, 20 Ky. Law Rep. 764, where it was said: ",The bill of exceptions does
not contain the connection in which these words were spoken. It may have
been in reply to some argument of the counsel for the appellant and, if so, it
might have been proper." Error to be available must fully appear by the
record since the. record is the only authentic evidence of the trial court pro-
ceedings. Railroad v. Goyette, 133 Ill. 21; Farrand v. Aldrich, 85 Mich.
393; Cecconiv. Rodden, 147 Mass. 164.
CRIMINAL LAW-MISCONDUCT OF JURY-NEW TRIAL.-MANN V. STATE, 83
S. W. 19s, (TEx.)-The conduct of a juror in telling the jury, in the jury room,
that defendant had hit prosecutor on the head with an ax-handle on a former
occasion, held, ground for a new trial.
It is misconduct on the part of a juror to give testimony to his associates
in tho jury room. Richards v. State, 36 Neb. 17; Ellis v. State, 33 Tex. Cr.
23-0
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L 508; but by the weight of authority, when a new trial is asked for on the
ground of misconduct of a juror it must be shown that -the party was
probably injured by such misconduct. Medlar "v. State, 26 Ind. x71; State v'.
Cross, 95 Iowa 629. Bearing directly on the principal case, it was said in
State v. Woodson, 41 Iowa 425, ' ' It is not sufficient to vitiate a verdict of con-
viction, that a juror made statements to his associates concerning defendant's
character from his own knowledge unless prejudice is shown to have resulted."
In a few cases it has been held that a presumption of prejudice arises from
proof of misconduct. Commonwealth v. Roby, 12 Pick. 496; Creek 7/. State,
24 Ind. xis. The better rule is that the matter of denyink a motion for new
trial for alleged misconduct on the part of the jury lies largely within the dis-
cretion of the trial court. Wiest v. Luyendyk, 73 Mich. 66x; People v. Johns
son, iio N. Y. 134; Com. v. White, 147 Mass. 76.
DAMAGES-PERSONAL INJURIES-FUTURE SUFFERING.-SCHWEND V. ST.
Louis TRANSIT Co., 80 S. W. 4o, (Mo.).-Held, that an instruction, in an action
for personal injuries, authorizing recovery for pain and anguish which plaintiff
"may" suffer in the future, is erroneous.
While damages for future suffering may unquestionably be awarded, it is
generally required that the suffering must be such as will necessarily follow.
Washington &- G. R. Co. v. Harmon's Admr., 147 U. S. 571; Filer v. N. Y.
C. R. CO., 49 N. Y. 42; Atlanta &- W, P. R. Co. v. Johnson, 66 Ga. 259. Or
at least must be reasonably certain. Ohio &- M. R. Co. v. Cosby, 1o7 Ind. 32;
Stutz v. Chieago & N. W. R. Co.- 73 Wis. I47. Such prospective suffering
must not be merely speculative. Strohm v. N. Y. L. E. &' W. R. Co., 96
N. Y. 305; Dawson v. City of Troy, 49 Hun 322. When the court had cor-
rectly charged the jury that such future suffering must be reasonably certain,
a request by the defendant to charge further that "damages must not be
assessed for merely possible or even probable future effects not now apparent,"
was properly refused because it would merely tend to confuse the jury. Kan-
sas City, F. S. &' M. R. Co. v'. Stoner, 49 Fed. 209. In Raymond v. Kesen-
burg, 9r Wis. 1g1, an instruction practically the same as that in the present
case was held to be erroneous and both decisions follow the weight of authority.
DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT-ELEMENTS OF COMPENSATION.-INTERNATIONAL
& G. N. R. Co. v. M CVEY, 81 S. W. 991 (Tzx.).-In an action to recover
damages for death by wrongful act brought under a statute similar to Lord
Campbell's Act, held, that the children of the deceased may recover not only
for the loss of the earning capacity of the father but also for the loss of his
care and counsel.
The liberal rule of compensation laid down in the present case is in
harmony with many decisions holding that the care and counsel of a parent
have a pecuniary value and that damages may be awarded for their loss.
Anthony Itiner Brick Co. vi. Ashly, 198 Ill. 562; Sternfels v'. Metrofiolitan St.
Ry. Co., 174 N. Y. 512; N. P. R. Co. v. Freeman, 83 Fed. 82. In many cases
however it is held that recovery cannot be had in the absence of evidence
that the deceased was fitted to give valuable advice and counsel. Walker v'.
Lake Shore R. Co., III Mich. 518; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v'. Townsend,
69 Ark. 380. In May vz. W. Jersey R. Co., 62 N. J. L. 63, it is held that the
counsel must relate to pecuniary matters in order to form an element of com-
pensation; while in Ill. R. Co. v. Bentz, io8 Tenn. 670, it is stated that a
wife cannot recover for the loss of the advice and counsel of her husband. In
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most jurisdictions no recovery can be had for mental suffering of the bene-
ficiary. State vi. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 24 Md. 84; Mansfield Coal, etc., Co. v.
McEnery, 91 Pa. St. x85; contra, Cleary v'. City R. Co., 76 Cal. 240; nor for
loss of society of deceased. Potter v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 21 Wis. 377;
Caldwell v. Brown, 53 Pa. St. 453; contra, Dyas v. So. Pae. R. Co., i4o Cal.
268. The tendency of the latest decisions is to allow damages only for
pecuniary loss and to award nothing by way of solatium.
EQUITY-FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-TRUsTS.-MONAHAN V. MONAHAN,
59 ATL. x6g, (VT.).-Where one makes a conveyance of securities to avoid
taxation and subsequently seeks to impress such securities with a trust, held,
that the complainant will not be denied relief when the issue raised by the
pleadings is without reference to the fraudulent conveyance. Tyler, Start,
and Stafford, JJ., dissenting.
There is a manifest distinction between cases such as the above and those
in which equitable relief would result in the enforcement of an illegal agree-
ment, as in Ritchie v. Smith, 6 C. B. 462. But the line of demarcation has
not been clearly drawn. Equity will not necessarily refuse its aid when a
party to an illegal transaction seeks relief in respect to property which has
been acquired thereby. Sharfi v'. Taylor, 2 Phil. Ch. 8ox; Tyler v. Tyler,
25 I. App. 333. But it is held in many jurisdictions that any unconscientiois
conduct connected with the controversy will preclude redress. Mitchell v.
Commissioners, 91 U. S. 2o6; Ransom v. Burlington, III Iowa 77- It is
said in some cases that relief will be given when the party does not have to
appeal to and rely upon the terms of the illegal agreement in establishing his
claim. Simbson v. Bloss, 7 Taunt. 246; Sfiring v. Knowlton, 103 U. S. 49.
This rests upon the ground that the violation of law has already been accom-
plished and no further detriment can result in compellingone who has property
in his possession belonging to another to make restitution. Gilliam v. Brown,
43 Miss. 641.
EVIDENcE-ANCIENT DEEDs-No WITNEssEs OR ACKNOWLEDGMENT.-
O'NEAL ET AL. v. TENNESSEE COAL, IRON & R. Co., 37 So. 275 (ALA.).-A
deed signed by the grantor by his mark only, not witnessed or acknowledged,
therefore insufficient on its face, held, inadmissible as an ancient deed with-
out proof of execution.
Proof of the execution of an ancient deed, apparently genuine, is not
necessary in order that it may be admitted in evidence. Fulherson v. Holmes,
117 U.'S. 389; Whitman v. Heneberry, 73 Ill. xog. The genuineness must
be established, fcCloskey v. Leadbetter, x Ga. 55x. The mere production is
not sufficient for its admission, Fogal v'. Pirro, 23 N. Y. xoo. Where an
instrument is admitted as an ancient deed it is admitted as being formally
executed by signing, sealing and delivery. Brown v. Wood, 6 Rich. Eq. 155.
What is necessary for a deed td show in order to be admitted as an ancient
deed without proof seems to differ in the several states. Antiquity alone is
not sufficient if the deed is apparently defective. Williams 'V. Boss, 22 Vt.
352; Reaume v. Chambers, 22 Mo. 36; thus where no consideration is ex-
pressed and the words "this indenture" are omitted. Gittings vz. Hall, I
Har. & J. 14. But they are upheld though defective in form and execution
in Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 83; Hoge v. Hobb, 94 Mo. 489; White v'. Hutchings,
40 Ala. 253. Failure to record power of attorney to convey is held not to be
fatal in Taylor v. Cox, 41 Ky. 429.
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EVIDENCE-INsANiTY-NoN-EXPERT TESTIMONY.-FREEMAN V. STATE, 81
S. W. 953, (Texas.).-Held, that in a prosecution for homicide the opinion of
a non-expert witness was properly excluded.
In most jurisdictions the opinion of an ordinary witness as to a person's
insanity is competent to go to the jury when, as in the present case, the wit-
ness has fully stated the facts and circumstances upon which such belief is
based. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. v. Rodel, 9 5 U. S. 232; Kimberly's Appeal,
68 Conn. 428; Title Ins. Co. r/. Gray, 15o Pa. St. 255. But in Maine and
Massachusetts such evidence is inadmissible whatever may have been the
witness' opportunities for observation, except in the case of a subscribing
witnesstoawill. Wyman ,. Gould, 47 Me. I59; McCoy v.fordan, 184 Mass.
575. In New York it is held that a non-expert may testify as to the facts and
incidents of which he has personal knowledge and may state whether, from
these indications, the patient impressed him as being rational or irrational but
the witness is not allowed to express an opinion as to the patient's mental
capacity. Paine v. Aldrich, 133 N. Y. 544; People v. Strait, 148 N. Y. 566.
In People vr. Borgetto, 99 Mich. 336, it is held that a witness who is shown to
have had reasonable opportunities for judging may testify that he saw noth-
ing to indicate insanity. But a witness cannot be allowed to express an
opinion that an individual is insane until he has stated the actions and conduct
upon which he founds his belief. Lamb v. L.Tfpincott, 115 Mich. 611. The
rule laid down in the present case is less liberal than that established by the
great weight of authority.
FIXTUREs-BUILDING MATERIAL-CONVEYANCE OF LAND AND PARTIALLY
CONSTRUCTED BUILDING.-BYRNE V. WERNER, 101 N. W. 555, (MIC.).-
Held, that cut stone and structural iron belonging to the owner of a lot on
which there is a partially completed building, secured by the owner for use in
the erection of the building, and lying on the same and adjoining lots at the
time of sale, passed by the owner's warranty deed of the lot on which the
building stood. Moore, C. J., and Hooker, J., dissenting.
It is the prevailing American doctrine that the character of a chattel
alleged to be a part of this realty is tobe determined by the intention with which
annexation is made; Hackett v Amsden, 57 Vt. 432; Gunderson v. Kennedy,
104 Ill. App. 117; yet when articles have not been actually annexed, but have
been brought on or near land with such intention, many authorities still
adhere to the English rule which accentuates the mode of annexation as the
test. Turner v. Cameron, S Q. B. 3o6. Rails lying on the land and intended
for a fence were held to be personalty in Thweat v. Stamfis, 67 Ala. 96; so of
lumber intended for a building; Carkin v. Babbitt, 58 N. H. 579; andin Peck
v. Batchelder, 40 Vt. 233, it was held that windows and blinds made to be
used in a house, but not actually put in place, were not part of the realty.
The opposite view is exemplified in Hackett v'. Amsden, suhra, and
McFadden v. Crawford, 36 W. Va. 671.
JURISDICTIoN-DECISION BY TRIBUNAL OF BENEFICIAL AssoCrATIoN-R vEIw
BY CouRTS.-DIcE v. SUPREME BODY OF INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS, IO N. W.
564 (MICH.).-A by-law of a beneficial association provided for a hearing,
before its supreme tribunal, on all contested death claims, and declared that
the decision of such tribunal should'be final. Held, that an adverse decision
of the tribunal, as to liability of a-certificate of membership, was not conclu-
sive where, upon a hearing of the claim, evidence was admitted which was
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within the terms of a statute forbidding a physician to disclose information
acquired in visiting a patient. Hooker and Grant, JJ., dissenting.
If laws of a beneficial order require it, and are not contrary to the law of
the land or to public policy, members must exhaust their remedy in the order
before resorting to the courts. Weigand v. Fraternities Accidental Order, 97
Md. 443; Schon v. Satoyoame Tribe, 140 Cal. 254. Contra, Whitney v. National
Masonic Ass'n., 52 Minn. 378. Rules of an order declaring that decisions of
its tribunal shall be final do not preclude a suit at law. BRy., Passenger and
Freight Conductors' Ass'n. v. Tucker, '57 Ill. i94; Daniher v. Grand
Lodge, A. 0. U. W., 1o Utah, ixo. Contra, Road v. Ry., Passenger and
Freight Conductors' Ass'n., 31 Fed. 62. Action of a tribunal of an order, in
determining status of a member, in absence of bad faith and if rules of the
order are reasonable, is not subject to review by the courts. Crook v. High
Court, 162 Ill. 298; Wolsey v. Odd Fellows Lodge, 6I Iowa 492. Findings
of a tribunal art not vitiated because technical rules of evidence are violated.
Barker v. Great Hive Ladies of Modern Maccabees, 98 N. W. 24 (Mich.).
Held, in Sperry's AjAfeal, 116 Pa. St. 391, that rejection of testimony that
should have been admitted at hearing before tribunal, was not ground for inter-
ference by the courts. Thus it would seem that courts review findings of frater-
nal tribunals because of rights which courts have to try such causes, regi'rdless
of the rules of the order, rather than because of some error in the proceedings
of the tribunal, as was the ground of review in this case.
LATERAL SUPPORT-APPROPRIATION OF LAND-DAMAGES TO ABUTTING
PROPERTY.-KANSAS CITY NORTHWESTERN R. Co. v. SCHWAKE, 78 PAC. 431,
(KAN.).-Held, that, since the actionable wrong for impairment to lateral sup-
port is not the excavation, a land owner does not sustain damages for the
deprivation of lateral support until there is an actual subsidence of the soil.
Mason and Burch, JJ., dissenting.
The doctrine followed in this case is of modem origin. It was first
declared in Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L. Cas. 503, which practically over-
ruled Micklin v. Williams, io Exch. 259, and was finally established in
Mlitchell v. Colliery Co., ii App. Cas. 127, where the question is exhaustively
discussed. These cases have been generally followed in the United States.
Schultz v. Bower, 57 Minn. 493; R. Co. v. Harlin, 50 Neb. 698; Smith v.
Seattle, IS Wash. 484. The theory upon which they rest is that the excava-
tion will not necessarily result in injury, since until there is a subsidence of
the soil the excavation may be repaired.
LIFE INSURANCE-ASSIGNMENT OF POLICY-INURABLE INTEREST.-GORDON
V. WARE NAT. BANK, 132 FED. 444.-Held, that an assignment of a life insur-
ance policy to one who has no insurable interest in the life of the assured is
valid, if not made as a cover to a wager.
A life insurance policy is not strictly a contract of indemnity, and at com-
mon law the insured was not required to have an insurable interest in the life.
The statute of r4 Geo. III. necessitated an interest at the inception of the con-
tract, but this necessity, it was held, did not attach to an assignee; Ashley vt.
Ashley, 3 Sim. 149; unless the assignment were a mere cover for a wager.
Wainwright v. Bland, i M. & Rob. 481. A dictum in Stevens v. Warren,
or Mass. 564, led to the Indiana doctrine that the assignee must have an
interest This has been denied in Massachusetts and in most of the states,
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lately in Indiana itself. The position which the Supreme Court has taken is
uncertain. Justice Field in Warnock v. Davis, xo4 U. S. 775, endorses the
Indiana doctrine, and in N. Y. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S.
591, 597, he apparently holds the same view.
TxADE-UNFAR COmPETITION-UsE OF SIMILAR SURNAME.-VAN HOUTIN
v. HooToN COCOA & CHOCOLATE Co., 13o FED. 6oo.-Defendant, a corpora-
tion named after its founder Hooton, in good faith manufactured and sold
"Hooton's Cocoa" by use of which name confusion in trade resulted to the
damage of complainants, makers of the well known "Van Houten's Cocoa."
Held, that such liability to confusion and deception was ground for granting
an injunction against the defendants' use of said name unless accompanied by
a clear statement distinguishing its cocoa from complainants'.
The basis for relief in unfair competition is fraud. Gorham Mfg. Co. v.
Dry Goods Co.. 104 Fed. 243; Day v. Webster, 49 N. Y. Supp. 314. The use
in good faith of one's name in connection with an article offered for sale is
generally held justifiable and damage resulting to another from similarity of
surnames is damnum absque injuria. Brown Chemical Co. v. Meyer, 139
U. S. 540; Nat'l Starch Mfg. Co. v. Duryea, ioz Fed. 117; Harson v. Hall.
yard, 22 R. I. io2; Hazelton Boiler Co. v. Hazelton Tri.Pod Boiler Co., 142
Ill. 494
UsuRY-PRomissoRy NOTE-LEx Loci CONTRACTUS.-WHITLOCK V. COHN
ET AL, 80 S. W. 14x, (ARx.).-Held, that the place of payment of a promis-
sory note will not be regarded as determining the place of the making of the.
contract so as to render the contract usurious, since the parties will not be
presumed to have contracted with reference to a law which will make the con-
tract illegal.
It is now well settled that where the place of the making of the contract
and the place of performance are the same, its validity as regards usury is
determined by the law of that jurisdiction and not by the law of the place
where the suit is brought. Merchants' Bank v. Griswold, 72 N.Y. 472; Phila-
delphia Loan Co. v. Towner, 13 Conn. 249. But when the contract is made
in one state and payment is to be made in another, there is much conflict
among the authorities. In some jurisdictions it is held without reserve that
the law of the place of performance must govern. Bennett v. Eastern Build-
ing &- Loan Association, 177 Pa. St. 233; People's Building & Loan Asso-
ciation v. Tinsley, 96 Va. 322. In Massachusetts the rule is that the law of
the place of execution and payment of the consideration will control. Akens
v. Demond, 103 Mass. 318; Glidden v. Chamberlin, 16.7 Mass. 486. In the
Federal courts and in many of the state courts, it is held, as in the present
case, that the intention of the parties is the controlling factor. Miller v.
Tiffany, I Wall. 298; Wayne Co. Savings Bank v. Lowe, 81 N. Y. 566;
Pancoast v. Travellers Ins. Co., 79 Ind. 172.
